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MONETIZING THE BENEFITS OF RISK AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
W. Kip Viscusi*
INTRODUCTION
Should the benefits of risk and environmental regulations be
monetized? For economists, this question is not controversial.
Benefits of government policies have a value given by society's
willingness to pay for these benefits, which by its very nature poses
the valuation issue in monetary terms.1 Government agencies have
likewise not shied away from monetizing these benefits.2 A con-
trary school of thought, however, has recently emerged, as re-
flected in the book by Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling,
Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of
Nothing. As the title of the book suggests, the authors oppose
economists' attempts to monetize the value of environmental
amenities and the value of risks to life and health. In this article, I
will review the history of how monetization of benefits came to be
the norm for government policy and explore some of the key eco-
nomic debates that have arisen.
My point of view is the opposite of that of adherents of the
Priceless approach. Monetizing risk and environmental benefits
does not devalue these outcomes, but rather gives them real eco-
nomic value when the effects might otherwise be ignored. Through
monetization, policymakers are able to count these policy conse-
quences fully and in accordance with the values attached to these
outcomes by the citizens affected by the policy. This is not to say
* John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.
University Distinguished Professor of Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law School
(Effective July 1, 2006).
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1. For a discussion of benefit assessment principles, see policy analysis texts such
as EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 149-
51 (1978).
2. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 4 (2004) (discussing the
EPA's removal of lead in gasoline after determining the health benefits of this action
in monetary value).
3. See id. at 8. For a general critique of their book, see ROBERT W. HAHN, IN
DEFENSE OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION (2005).
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that there are no controversies that remain once the monetization
approach has been adopted. This Article will explore many of the
most sensitive and problematic concerns, including how we should
value risks to life, whether old people or rich people should be ac-
corded different values of life, and the proper role of survey meth-
ods in benefit valuations. The existence of such controversies
arises because the economic approach confronts these policy mat-
ters directly and incorporates recognition of how these concerns
are valued by the citizenry. In contrast, the Priceless approach in
effect disenfranchises the citizens by abandoning the societal will-
ingness-to-pay approach to benefits. With no effort to quantify cit-
izens' valuations, the policy process will be guided by the subjective
preferences of policymakers.
From an economic standpoint, the advantages of monetizing
benefits are quite strong because establishing this kind of metric
makes it much easier to compare benefits with costs and thus make
choices across various policy alternatives.4 For example, if we have
$10 million to spend, is it more worthwhile to clean up a hazardous
waste site on Long Island, or to reduce water pollution levels in
Wisconsin rivers by ten percent, or to adopt safety measures that
will lead to an average of three fewer schoolchildren being killed in
school bus crashes? Because society's resources are limited, ulti-
mately we must be making choices such as these across different
policy domains. To assess which regulatory interventions make
sense and which do not, it is essential to have a scorecard by which
it is feasible to make such comparisons.
Monetization also has an additional practical benefit in a world
of regulatory impact analysis. Costs are quantifiable in dollar
terms, as are many benefit components, so failing to place a mone-
tary value on seemingly intangible benefits such as environmental
amenities may lead to inadequate attention to intangible benefits
in the policy choice process. Monetizing these benefits puts them
on equal footing with benefits that are perceived to have real eco-
nomic value because they can be quantified in dollar terms.
It is useful at the outset to make clear the target of my discus-
sion. From an economic standpoint, for something to be "price-
less" means that it has an infinite value. Thus, if saving the snail
darter is priceless, no amount of monetary cost should be spared in
preserving these fish, even if it depletes the entire GDP. Because
no risk or environmental benefit warrants an infinite expenditure,
4. See HAHN, supra note 3, at 44 (discussing how scorecards make the regulatory
process more transparent).
[Vol. XXXIII1004
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the practical policy issue is what level of monetary cost is justified
to obtain the benefit. With costs in dollar terms as our numeraire,
the policy choice has the structure of involving an explicit or im-
plicit decision that the value of the benefits exceeds that of the
costs for the policy to be worthwhile. Ackerman and Heinzerling
oppose this monetization, as well as the cost-benefit approach, but
are not clear on what operational substitute or policy criterion they
favor. However, it is doubtful that they consider any benefits to be
truly "priceless" in the economic sense.5
It is useful to start with a bit of background regarding how bene-
fit assessment became a central focus of the policy evaluation pro-
cess. Beginning with the Reagan administration a quarter century
ago, regulatory agencies have been required to assess the costs and
benefits of proposed new regulations.6 Although the economic
principles underlying such benefit assessments are well-established,
the appropriate methodologies for benefit assessment continue to
evolve.7 Moreover, as the frontiers of the benefit valuation re-
search are extended, new controversies have arisen with respect to
the appropriate valuation of these benefits.8 The benefits associ-
ated with health, safety, and environmental risk regulations are
particularly controversial because of their distinctive economic
characteristics, such as the fact that one's life cannot be replaced. 9
Because these categories of benefits have been the focal point of
the "priceless" debate, this paper examines an economic approach
to monetizing health, safety, and environmental benefits, with a
primary focus on the value of risks to life.
The current regulatory oversight process administered by the
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is governed by Executive Or-
der 12,866, which was issued by the Clinton administration and has
remained in effect since 1993.10 This executive order requires that
agencies assess regulatory benefits and costs and suggests that they
explore possible monetization of these benefits. Ix In particular,
section 1(b)(6) states: "Each agency shall assess both the costs and
5. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 985 (11th ed. 2003) (de-
fining "priceless" as "having a value beyond any price").
6. The Reagan administration executive order was Executive Order 12,291.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
7. See HAHN, supra note 3, at 1-2.
8. See id.
9. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 8.
10. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
11. Id. at 51,736, 51,741.
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the benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some
costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regu-
lation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs. '1 2
For all major regulatory initiatives, Executive Order 12,866, sec-
tion 6(a)(C)(ii) requires that agencies undertake the following ben-
efits analysis:
An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of benefits an-
ticipated from the regulatory action (such as, but not limited to,
the promotion of the efficient functioning of the economy and
private markets, the enhancement of health and safety, the pro-
tection of the natural environment, and the elimination or re-
duction of discrimination or bias) together with, to the extent
feasible, a quantification of those benefits[.] 13
In theory, government agencies could use a variety of possible
metrics to measure benefits. One could, for example, translate
benefits into equivalent numbers of statistical lives that are saved,
river miles for which the water quality is improved, endangered
species that are saved, or some other metric. The primary currency
in which benefits are assessed is dollars because, ultimately, agen-
cies are required to compare benefits and costs. From the stand-
point of maximizing social welfare, they should choose those
regulations that provide the greatest net benefits to society, though
their legislative mandates are often framed more narrowly. Be-
cause costs are in financial terms, placing benefits in comparable
terms would place them on equal footing and facilitate such com-
parison. Moreover, most economic commodities are traded in
markets and, as a consequence, explicit monetary prices are availa-
ble.14 As I will indicate below, many environmental commodities
are traded implicitly in markets or have values that can be elicited
through simulated market experiments, and, as a result, it is feasi-
ble to attach dollar values to many seemingly unquantifiable
benefits.15
The OMB has continued to emphasize the importance of mone-
tizing benefits in the various reports it has issued in its efforts to
outline the analytical underpinnings of regulatory impact assess-
12. Id. at 51,736.
13. Id. at 51,741.
14. The central role of prices in markets is discussed in many textbooks, such as N.
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 9 (4th ed. 2006).
15. The use of surveys and market experiments to derive implicit values of life are
discussed in W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITER-
ATURE 1912 (1993) [hereinafter Viscusi, Value of Risks].
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ment. In its 2003 OMB Circular A-4, OIRA reiterated the impor-
tance of quantifying benefits. Its outline of the key elements of
regulatory analysis included the following comment:
With this information, you should be able to assess quantita-
tively the benefits and costs of the proposed rule and its alterna-
tives. A complete regulatory analysis includes a discussion of
non-quantified as well as quantified benefits and costs. A non-
quantified outcome is a benefit or cost that has not been quanti-
fied or monetized in the analysis.' 6
OMB expands on these requirements by emphasizing the impor-
tance of monetizing benefits from the standpoint of establishing
comparability with costs: "A distinctive feature of BCA [Benefit-
Cost Analysis] is that both benefits and costs are expressed in mon-
etary units, which allows you to evaluate different regulatory op-
tions with a variety of attributes using a common measure. "17
Even though monetization of benefits has become a standard op-
erating procedure as part of regulatory policy assessment, there
nevertheless are legitimate economic controversies that remain.
The remainder of the Article explores some of the ongoing debates
within the economics community as well as the more salient criti-
ques that non-economists have offered.
The Value of Statistical Life Concept
Many might view it as immoral to place a value on human life.
That task is fortunately not before us. What we face is the closely-
related task of valuing the reduction of small risks to life. How
much is society willing to pay to reduce the risk of cancer from
hazardous waste exposures by one chance in 10,000 for a person
exposed to the risk over a thirty-year period? Structuring our ap-
proach to answer questions such as these is straightforward based
on the fundamental guidelines for benefit assessment. The gov-
erning principle for benefit assessment generally, as well as for
benefit assessment for regulatory policies, is the value of the bene-
fit in terms of society's willingness to pay for these benefits. 18 Ap-
16. OFFICE OF MGTrr. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 3
(Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter OMB, CIRCULAR A-4], available at http://www.white
house.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
17. Id. at 10.
18. CIRCULAR A-4 makes the following observation:
"Opportunity cost" is the appropriate concept for valuing both benefits and
costs. The principle of "willingness-to-pay" (WTP) captures the notion of
opportunity cost by measuring what individuals are willing to forgo to enjoy
a particular benefit. In general, economists tend to view WTP as the most
2006] 1007
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plying this concept to health, safety, and environmental
regulations, the appropriate benefit value is society's willingness to
pay for the risk reduction or environmental improvement that will
result from the policy. The methodology that equates benefits with
society's willingness to pay for the change in policy outcomes by its
very nature is conceptually closely linked to potential monetization
of benefits.
What benefit outcome being valued depends on the policy con-
text. For some environmental policies, the benefit outcome is quite
concrete. As a result of a policy preventing pollution near national
parks, visibility in those areas will improve.'9 In most instances of
health, safety, and environmental regulations that I have seen, the
benefit is defined in terms of a distribution of possible outcomes.
Thus, if a regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) or the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) will lead to benefits in terms of ten reduced ex-
pected cancer deaths per year, then the benefit outcome to be val-
ued is the number of statistical lives that are saved, which for this
example is ten. We do not know in advance which particular peo-
ple will be saved by the regulation, nor do we know that exactly ten
people will be saved every year. It could be more or less than ten,
but our best estimate based on the dose-response relationship for
the chemicals being reduced and the levels of exposures for these
chemicals is that the mean value of the distribution of the number
of lives that will be saved is ten.
This willingness-to-pay principle links up quite directly with
economists' approach to valuing risks to life and health, but not to
fatality valuation methodologies used for other purposes, such as
compensation for victims of wrongful death. 20 The early studies on
the value of life equated the value of people's lives to the present
appropriate measure of opportunity cost, but an individual's "willingness-to-
accept" (WTA) compensation for not receiving the improvement can also
provide a valid measure of opportunity cost.
Id. at 18.
19. See generally William D. Schulze et al., The Economic Benefits of Preserving
Visibility in the National Parklands of the Southwest, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149
(1983); see also LAURAINE G. CHESTNUT & ROBERT D. ROWE, PRESERVATION VAL-
UES FOR VISIBILITY PROTECTION AT THE NATIONAL PARKS, http://yosemite.epa.gov/
ee/epa/eerm.nsf/Geographic%20Area!OpenView&Start=117 (follow "Yosemite Na-
tional Park" hyperlink; then follow "Preservation Values for Visibility Protection at
the National Parks (02/16/1990)" hyperlink).
20. These different approaches are contrasted in W. Kip Viscusi, Misuses and
Proper Uses of Hedonic Values of Life in Legal Contexts, 13 J. FORENSIC ECON. 111
(2000) [hereinafter Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses].
1008 [Vol. XXXIII
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value of their lost earnings, as in the case of court awards for per-
sonal injury.21 This approach has the advantage of being a magni-
tude that is easy to calculate. 2 All one needs is an estimate of
individual earnings at different points in time, a measure of work-
life expectancy, and a rate of discount used to convert future earn-
ings losses into present dollar terms. 3 This approach to valuing life
is appropriate for court cases in which compensation is paid to the
surviving family members for a fatal accident and to the accident
victim in the case of nonfatal accidents.24 In some instances, these
present value of lost earnings calculations are also reduced by the
taxes or the consumption value that the deceased would have had,
where these rules differ by jurisdiction. 5
It is noteworthy that these present-value calculations will have
quite strong distributional consequences. The simple mathematics
is that if one's annual earnings are doubled, then the present value
of one's lost earnings doubles as well. Thus, court awards will be
proportional to income levels, leading more affluent accident vic-
tims to receive higher levels of compensation than less affluent vic-
tims. There is an underlying rationale for these differences and for
the use of present value of lost earnings more generally to the ex-
tent that the function of such awards is to serve as insurance. 6
People with higher income have suffered a greater income loss
than those with a lower income, so that to maintain their current
economic standard, higher levels of compensation are needed.2 7
This line of analysis is quite compelling in the case of monetary
losses, but in the case of irreplaceable health effects, it is not obvi-
ous that a disabled person with an annual income of $100,000
should receive twice the level of compensation as a disabled person
with an annual income of $50,000.28 Thus, the court-awarded com-
21. Dorothy P. Rice & Barbara S. Cooper, The Economic Value of Life, 57 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH & NATION'S HEALTH 1954, 1954-66 (1967).
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1955-56.
24. See generally ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INJURY AND DEATH DAMAGES
(Roger T. Kaufman et al. eds., 2005).
25. See STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH: ECONOMIC
HANDBOOK 2, 39 (2d ed. 1979); W. Cris Lewis & Tyler J. Bowles, Alternative Ap-
proaches to Tax Adjustments in Appraising Economic Loss, J. LEGAL ECON., Spring/
Summer 1996, at 27.
26. Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses, supra note 20, at 117.
27. If the monetary loss is higher, the "make whole" amount will be greater. See
id. (explaining the "make whole" concept).
28. W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 195-222 (2000), reprinted in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRON-
2006] 1009
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pensation amounts are not immune from potential controversy
with respect to their distributional consequences.
Although the present value of lost earnings approach is often
pertinent for insuring the income losses of accident victims, it is not
linked to the guiding principle for benefit assessment, which is soci-
ety's willingness to pay for the benefit.29 In the case of a small risk
of death, such as one in 100,000, a person with a lifetime income
with a present value of $700,000 might well be willing to pay more
than seven dollars to eliminate this risk, even though seven dollars
represents 1/100,000 of his or her lifetime wealth. The appropriate
matter of concern is the amount of money that the person is willing
to pay to reduce the small probability of death, or the risk-money
tradeoff, and this amount is not limited to the fatality risk value
multiplied by one's lifetime wealth.30 Such a constraint is binding
for the certainty of death, but not for very small risks.
Consider the following example that illustrates the fundamentals
of the value of statistical life ("VSL") concept. Suppose that you
are in a group of 100,000 people, and that one of you will die with
certainty. The risk of death is a random event that affects all peo-
ple equally. How much would you be willing to pay to eliminate
this risk? Suppose the answer is $70 for each person in the group.
What this value implies is that collectively, the group of 100,000
people would be willing to spend $7 million to eliminate the risk of
one statistical death to their group. Put in somewhat different
terms, the willingness-to-pay value of seventy dollars divided by
the risk reduction of one chance in 100,000 also equals $7 million.
Because we are dealing with the willingness to pay to reduce small
probabilities of death, the $7 million value for statistical life need
not be constrained by the present value of the person's earnings.
The individual is not buying out of the risk of certain death, but
rather is simply purchasing a minor reduction in the risk of death.
The value of statistical life that would be pertinent for much
greater risk reductions would, of course, be potentially different,
but the amount of risk reduction associated with government regu-
latory policies is typically quite low.
MENT: SELECTED READINGS (Robert N. Stavins ed., 5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Viscusi,
Legal Contexts].
29. SIOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 149-51.
30. Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses, supra note 20, at 115.
1010 [Vol. XXXIII
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Estimating the Value of Statistical Life
There are two principal approaches that can be used to derive
the value of the risk-money tradeoff that people have for fatality
risks: survey approaches or statistical estimates of values implied
by actual risk taking decisions.3' One could run a survey asking
people their willingness to pay for a risk reduction. Such contin-
gent valuation or stated preference surveys present respondents
with a hypothetical fatality risk situation and ask how much they
would pay for a particular risk reduction.32 A considerable litera-
ture has outlined requirements that such studies should meet to be
reliable, such as providing a credible scenario and payment mecha-
nism to respondents.33 As discussed below, OMB has also detailed
the requirements that stated preference studies should meet.34 Ul-
timately, however, stated preferences are not real decisions.3 To
the extent that we can elicit values of statistical life based on actual
choices that people make, then it is likely that these decisions will
provide more reliable evidence of people's valuation of real risks
than would surveys' valuations of hypothetical risks.36 Neverthe-
less, well-designed surveys often play a quite valuable role in deriv-
ing values for environmental commodities and health outcomes for
which good market data are not readily available.37
The dominant source of evidence regarding VSL is derived from
market data.38 Although risks to life are not treated explicitly in
markets, they are often bundled with other commodities that are in
fact traded.39 Workers on hazardous jobs will receive compensat-
ing wage differentials for jobs that pose additional risk. This theo-
retical approach, which was introduced by Adam Smith, pertains to
31. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1926-27 (for labor market esti-
mates); id. at 1940 (for survey evidence).
32. Id. at 1939.
33. W. Kip Viscusi, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOM-
ICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 780-81 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter VISCUSI ET
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION].
34. In particular, see OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 23.
35. Id. at 24 ("[Y]ou should prefer revealed preference data over stated prefer-
ence data because revealed preference data are based on actual decisions, where mar-
ket participants enjoy or suffer the consequences of their decisions.").
36. Id.
37. Id. at 22.
38. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 6
(2003) [hereinafter Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life].
39. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1913-14.
20061 1011
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other markets as well.40 Product market prices will be lower for
risky products, and housing prices will be lower for houses in more
dangerous neighborhoods.
It is worth noting at the outset that analyses of these various
risk-money tradeoffs differ somewhat in the risk tradeoff they are
measuring. The labor market wage premium for fatality risks is a
willingness to accept ("WTA") measure. 41 How much must the
worker get paid to be willing to incur a greater risk? In contrast,
for risky products and risky houses, the measure is a willingness to
pay ("WTP") measure, in that a person would be paying a higher
price for the product or the house for a higher safety level.42 For
very small changes in risk, the WTA and WTP measures of the
risk-money tradeoff should be the same, from an economic stand-
point.43 However, in experimental contexts, often there is a con-
siderable difference in these values, as the WTA often greatly
exceeds the WTP value. 44
There have been dozens of studies of VSL using labor market
data from the United States as well as throughout the world. The
general approach researchers have used is to formulate a regres-
sion analysis model in which the worker's wage rate is a function of
a variety of demographic characteristics and job characteristics, in-
cluding the fatality rate for the worker's occupation and industry.45
Based on a comprehensive survey of such studies in the United
States, Viscusi and Aldy found that in year 2000 U.S. dollars, the
median value of statistical life was $6.7 million.46 If a typical
worker in the United States faces an on-the-job fatality risk of one
chance in 25,000, a $6.7 million value of life implies that that
worker receives an extra $268 per year in compensation for the
additional risk.47 As one would expect, the estimates of VSL are
40. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 115-17 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1776).
41. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1918 n.16.,
42. Id.
43. Id. (describing survey and results).
44. For an example of extreme difference of this type, see W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley
A. Magat & Joel Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of
Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465 (1987).
45. W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR RISK 34-41 (1992) [hereinafter Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS].
46. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 63 tbl.A.
47. Multiplying 1/25,000 and $6.7 million equals $268. For similar examples, see
VIsCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 719.
1012 [Vol. XXXIII
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lower in less affluent countries, such as South Korea, India, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan.48
To what extent should we view wage-risk tradeoffs implied by
small risks as being reliable? While the fatality risks are now on
the order of 1/25,000 annually, in earlier studies the U.S. workplace
was more dangerous, with risks on the order of 1/10,000.4 9 The ac-
tual precision of such estimates should not be a matter for idle
speculation. From a statistical standpoint, all such estimates have
an associated estimated error, and it is feasible to construct perti-
nent confidence intervals around these values.50
The estimates are reasonably robust and have remained quite
stable over time, controlling for inflation.51 Similarly, VSL esti-
mates based on labor market studies, product market studies, and
housing market purchases all yield similar answers. 52 Survey stud-
ies that specifically elicit WTP values for reductions in risk likewise
generate estimates in the same range. 3 Thus, while the various
estimates do not resolve whether VSL is $6 million, $8 million, or
$10 million, we can be quite confident that wildly different VSL
numbers are not appropriate.
Heterogeneity and VSL
The variables that affect differences in VSL accord with many of
one's expectations. A principal implication of the Viscusi and Aldy
2003 meta-analysis pertains to the income elasticity of VSL.54 In
particular, they found that this income elasticity was in the range of
0.5 to 0.6, or put somewhat differently, a ten percent increase in
one's income will raise the value of one's statistical life by five per-
cent to six percent.55 The responsiveness of the VSL to income
levels is positive, as one would expect.5 6
This positive income elasticity is consistent with other economic
behaviors, given the positive relationship of a variety of health and
48. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 36.
49. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1913.
50. For an example of such confidence intervals see Richard Thaler & Sherwin
Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 265, 294 (Nestor R. Terleckyj ed., 1976).
51. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 18-21.
52. Id. at 19-21, 25 (tables of survey results).
53. Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 73.
54. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 36-43.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id.
20061 1013
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safety expenditures with respect to individual income. 7 Note,
however, that the percentage change in the VSL with respect to a
percentage increase in income is less than proportional.5 8 In con-
trast, the present value of lost earnings measure is strictly propor-
tional to one's income. The role of income elasticity will be quite
central to subsequent discussions of appropriate recognition of dis-
tributional considerations pertaining to VSL.
Contrary to the claims by Ackerman and Heinzerling, the VSL
methodology does not assume that all deaths are equally unattrac-
tive.59 For example, one would expect people to have a different
value for death resulting from cancer as opposed to an accidental
death on the job. Because market data are not well suited to mak-
ing these distinctions, the emphasis instead has been on stated pref-
erence approaches in which people reveal their automobile death
risk equivalent for a risk of cancer.60 We have developed such esti-
mates for both fatal and nonfatal cases of cancer. There have also
been exploratory survey analyses of attitudes toward different
types of deaths using a student convenience sample.61
Another possible approach to capturing differences in the quan-
tity and quality of life is the quality-adjusted life years ("QALY")
methodology. This methodology seeks to take into account both
the amount of life left as well as the quality of these life years,
usually using some kind of stated preference format.62 The QALY
approach may also entail the use of third-party experts rather than
eliciting values of those actually affected by a policy.63 Although
recognizing these two different aspects of longevity makes sense
conceptually, the QALY methodology is not sound from an eco-
nomic standpoint. 6' For example, based on the QALY methodol-
57. See generally William N. Evans & W. Kip Viscusi, Income Effects and the Value
of Health, 28 J. HUM. RESOURCES 497, 497-518 (1993) (exploring the effect of income
on willingness to pay for safer products to affect health).
58. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 37, 40 tbl.7.
59. Some confusion along these lines is exhibited in the discussion by Frank Ack-
erman and Lisa Heinzerling in ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 70.
60. See generally Wesley A. Magat, W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber, A Reference
Lottery Metric for Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1118 (1996).
61. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259
(1997).
62. See John M. Miyamoto et al., The Zero Condition: A Simplifying Assumption
in QALY Measurement and Multiattribute Utility, 44 MOMrr. ScI. 839 (1998).
63. Studies of medical decisions sometimes use patient populations, while other
studies use health professionals. See Patrick Hofstetter & James K. Hammitt, Select-
ing Human Health Metrics for Environmental Decision-Support Tools, 22 RISK ANAL-
Ysis 965, 971-72 (2002).
64. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 13.
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ogy, a twenty percent reduction in one's lifespan would have the
same value if one had five remaining years of life or fifty remaining
years of life.65
Although $7 million is a consensus estimate for VSL based on
labor market studies, the value of a statistical life is not a natural
constant.66 It may differ across time and across individuals.67 The
VSL number simply represents the tradeoff people have exhibited
between risk and money.68 People may have quite different prefer-
ences regarding the balance they wish to strike, just as they do for
other economic commodities. Because of this heterogeneity, dif-
ferent samples of workers with a different mix of job risks and oc-
cupations often generate estimates of VSL that differ.
On a theoretical basis, one should be consistent and strike the
same fatality risk-cost tradeoff across all domains of one's deci-
sions, assuming that there are continuous risky choices available.
Some decisions are, of course, lumpy, in that you either choose to
wear a ski helmet or not to wear a ski helmet. It is interesting,
however, that the wide range of estimates of VSL from the product
and housing market often yield similar estimates to those found in
the labor market, despite the mix of individuals making the choices
being different and the frequent lumpiness of the decisions that are
available in these contexts.69
The implied VSL revealed by personal decisions is in the range
of $3.8 million to $5.4 million for the purchase of used cars, $5.13
million based on a study of the purchase of new cars, at least $1
million based on seatbelt usage decisions, from $4.3 to $5 million
based on housing price responses to the presence of hazardous
waste sites, and at least $2.1 to $4.3 million based on the purchase
of bike helmets. 70 Similarly, survey studies yield expressed willing-
ness-to-pay values that are in the single-digit million dollar range.71
A particularly interesting manifestation of heterogeneous atti-
tude toward risks is that of smokers. Smoking is by far the greatest
health risk that millions of consumers take.72 To the extent that
65. For this critique and related comments on the QALY approach, see id.
66. See Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 28, at 205-08 (discussing VSL).
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 24-25.
70. See id. at 25.
71. The U.S. surveys reported in Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1940,
are all in the single-digit range.
72. W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO
DEAL 1 (2002) [hereinafter Viscusi, SMOKE-FILLED RooMs].
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people are making consistent risk-taking decisions across different
domains, one would also expect smokers to exhibit different and
substantially lower risk-money tradeoffs than nonsmokers. 73 Com-
pared to nonsmokers, smokers are ten percent less likely to wear
their seatbelts, five percent less likely to check their blood pres-
sure, two times more likely to have a home accident, and are nine
percent less likely to floss their teeth.7 4 Smokers also work on risk-
ier jobs in terms of the average annual injury risk associated with
the job.75 Moreover, controlling for the riskiness of the job, smok-
ers are more likely to be injured.76 In terms of the value of statisti-
cal injury, which is the nonfatal risk analog of VSL, smokers
exhibit an implicit value of $20,000 per statistical injury as com-
pared to $39,000 for nonsmokers.77 A sometimes difficult question
for policy analysis is the extent to which personal differences in risk
preferences such as these should be reflected in policy evaluations.
In his commentary on my conference presentation of this paper,
Adam Scales raised the interesting issue of differences in VSL by
gender and race.7 s Consider first the case of labor market evidence
on risk premiums for women.79 The compensating differential for
risk question is twofold. First, do women work at risky jobs for
which one would expect there to be a premium for the hazards
posed by the job? Second, is there evidence that in fact women do
get paid more for jobs that pose additional health and safety risks?
Empirical analysis of gender-specific differences in risk levels indi-
cates that women do work in jobs that often pose injury risks, but
on average these jobs are safer than men's jobs. 0 Given that wo-
men face job risks, the labor market premiums for risk function in
much the same way for women as for men. Just as men receive
compensating wage differentials for the job risks they face, female
employees do as well. l
73. Most of the evidence here comparing smokers to nonsmokers is drawn from
W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers, 83 REv. ECON.
& STAT. 269, 269 (2001); see generally Viscusi, SMOKE-FILLED RooMs, supra note 72.
74. VIscUsi, SMOKE-FILLED RooMs, supra note 72, at 169.
75. See Viscusi & Hersch, supra note 73, at 274.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 276.
78. Adam Scales, Professor, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the
Fordham Urban Law Journal Symposium: The Contemporary Regulatory State (Feb.
23, 2006).
79. See generally Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job
Injury Risks, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 598 (1998).
80. Id. at 606.
81. See id. at 598. Note that this study examined injury rates and did not consider
VSLs by gender.
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The more interesting demographic differences are with respect
to race. In a recent article, I examined racial differences in fatality
risk premiums, which in turn can be used to calculate how VSL
levels vary by race.82 Black workers exhibited VSL levels that
were below those of White workers.83 The more interesting aspect
of the analysis was the exploration of the cause of these VSL dif-
ferences. These racial differences were not solely attributable to
differences in workers' attitudes toward risk, but rather, they could
be traced to differences in market opportunities. 84 White workers
are choosing jobs from a different set of wage-risk combinations
that is not available to Black workers. Insofar as the differences
in VSL are a consequence of less attractive job options that are
possibly the result of discriminatory effects, Black workers do not
necessarily indicate a greater willingness to bear risk.86 An impor-
tant caveat that should pertain to any attempt to recognize hetero-
geneity in VSL levels is that VSL studies of observed market risk
tradeoffs reflect the influence of both market opportunities and
preferences of those bearing the risk.87 Consequently, one should
be cautious in attributing observed differences to risk
preferences.88
Valuing Expected Lives Saved for Policy Analysis
The watershed event that led to the use of the value-of-life meth-
odology for regulatory benefit assessment was the 1982 debate be-
tween OSHA and OMB over the proposed new hazard
communication regulation.89 OSHA prepared a regulatory impact
analysis of this costly regulatory proposal, which for the first time
would have required the labeling of dangerous chemicals in the
workplace. 90 Because, in OSHA's view, life was too sacred to
value, instead the agency calculated the cost of death for the work-
ers whose lives would be saved by the proposed regulation. 91 Us-
82. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a
Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 239 (2003).
83. Id. at 242.
84. Id. at 240.
85. Id. at 240-43.
86. Id. at 243.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. For a general description of this debate and of my role in it, see Pete Earley,
What's a Life Worth?, WASH. POST MAG., June 9, 1985, at 11; see also Viscusi, FATAL
TRADEOFFS, supra note 45.
90. Earley, supra note 89, at 11-13.
91. Id.
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ing the present value of the workers' lost earnings and medical
costs as a measure of the benefits value led to a relatively low ben-
efit assessment and a subsequent OMB challenge to the regula-
tion.92 OSHA then appealed OIRA's rejection of the regulation to
then-Vice President Bush.93 I was asked by both parties to settle
the dispute between the two agencies over the regulatory analysis.
By using my labor market estimates of the value of life as well as
the implicit value of nonfatal injuries, I was able to show that bene-
fits were approximately an order of magnitude greater than what
OSHA had estimated. 94 The result was that benefits exceeded
costs based on a proper assessment of these health and safety bene-
fits. 95 The day after my report in favor of the regulation reached
the Reagan White House, the regulation was issued.96
Since that time, there has been widespread adoption of the VSL
approach throughout the federal government.97 The methodology
offers the advantage of being based on sound economic theory and
empirical work, and has the practical benefit for regulatory agen-
cies of making their regulations look much more attractive than
they otherwise would had they continued to rely on the present
value of lost earnings approach.9"
Armed with this methodology, do we then have a basis for ap-
proaching policy decisions involving identified lives, such as a girl
trapped in a well or a coal miner trapped underground? Should we
apply the current VSL number of $7 million and save them only if
the cost of doing so is below that amount? In these instances, the
policy is not saving statistical lives but identified lives. Society's
willingness to pay to reduce the risk of death for identified victims
from a one-hundred percent chance of death to the certainty of life
may be quite different than our attitude toward reducing statistical
deaths arising from very small probabilities.
The identified girl in a well or trapped coal miner also have the
advantage of substantial publicity that will evoke altruistic con-
cerns.99 Indeed, this altruism is often so great that the special sta-
tus accorded to identified lives is not restricted to people; as a
society we also have a review of the willingness to spend substan-
92. Id.
93. See Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 261-63.
94. See id. at 262-63.
95. Id. at 263.
96. Earley, supra note 89, at 13.
97. HAHN, supra note 3, at 24.
98. Id. at 35.
99. Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 21.
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tial sums to try to save the lives of beached whales. Saving these
identified lives also tends to be a relatively infrequent event, which
may affect the extent of society's broader altruistic interests. Our
willingness to pay to save identified lives may be reduced if we
confronted as an identified life the possibility of saving the lives of
each of the 44,600 people killed each year in motor-vehicle acci-
dents." The deaths of over 100 identified lives per day would
surely generate less public attention per death than the rarer ca-
lamities that lead to trapped coal miners or sailors lost at sea.
Age and the Senior Discount
One of the most controversial contexts in which the heterogene-
ity of attitudes toward risk has surfaced has pertained to whether
the lives of older people should be given a lower benefit value than
the young. This general topic has come under the heading of a
"death discount," "senior death discount," and "senior dis-
count." 10 1 The policy context in which this debate arose was the
EPA analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative, in which it applied a
thirty-seven percent discount to the VSL benefit figure for those
who are age sixty-five and older.1 02 The reason for the controversy
was twofold. First, there was the clearly sensitive issue of whether
the lives of the elderly should be valued less than the lives of those
younger than age sixty-five. 10 3 Second, because the lion's share of
the benefits of the Clear Skies Initiative are for reducing fatalities
among those aged sixty-five and over, the application of a senior
discount has a nontrivial effect on the assessed benefits.' n In
100. The motor vehicle accident death toll is for 2004, from NAT'L SAFETY COUN-
CIL, TRAFFIC SAFETY STATISTICS 3 (2005), available at http://www.nsc.org/issues/driv-
ing/TrafficSafetyApr2005.pdf.
101. See among the following journalistic accounts of this debate John J. Fialka,
EPA to Stop "Death Discount" to Value New Regulations, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2003,
at D3; Katharine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, E.P.A. Drops Age-Based Cost Studies,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at A34; Cindy Skrzycki, Under Fire: EPA Drops the "Senior
Death Discount," WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at El.
102. The thirty-seven percent senior discount figure is from U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF
THE CLEAR SKIES INITIATIVE 35-37 (2002) (noting a VSL of $3.7 million for those
under age sixty-five and a VSL of $2.3 million for those sixty-five and older, a thirty-
seven percent discount), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/techadden.
pdf. The reduced annual fatalities figures for the regulation are from U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT ANAL-
YSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES ACT OF 2003, at 64 (2003) [hereinafter EPA, TECHNICAL
ADDENDUM 2003], available at http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech-addendum.pdf.
103. Skrzycki, supra note 101, at El.
104. See W. KIP Viscusi & JOSEPH E. ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES OF THE
SENIOR DISCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE 1 (2006) [hereinafter VIs-
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terms of the long-term exposure analysis, the reduced annual fatal-
ities in the year 2010 would be 1,900 for those eighteen to sixty-
four and 6,000 for those aged sixty-five and over.10 5 Application of
this senior adjustment increases the undiscounted benefits in that
year from $48.2 billion to $48.7 billion. 06
Much of the confusion around the senior discount debate could
have been avoided had the policy debate focused on first princi-
ples. Are the lives of senior citizens worth less, and whose values
count in such an assessment? The key question is whether the will-
ingness to pay to reduce fatality risks declines with age and, if so,
by how much? If all of us lived forever then there would be a quite
legitimate concern about differentiating the VSL benefit value ac-
cording to age. However, with a finite lifespan, the reduced risk to
life will save a different amount of the commodity based on one's
remaining life expectancy. One's willingness to pay to reduce a fa-
tality risk is likely to vary with the amount of the remaining life, as
sixty remaining life years is a larger commodity than a month or
two of remaining life for individuals suffering from advanced re-
spiratory failure.
Treating the VSL differentially based on age may seem to some
to be inequitable in that the lives of people are being valued differ-
ently.10 7 By the same token, one could claim that it is inequitable
to value the risks to life for those who have a very short life expec-
tancy at the same value as those who have a very long life expec-
tancy, because doing so places a much higher premium per year of
life saved for the old than for the young.10 8 In the absence of em-
pirical evidence, one can divide the estimated VSL of $7 million by
the average remaining lifetime or discounted expected remaining
years of life for those workers to calculate a value per life year.
Doing so implicitly assumes that each life year is equally attractive.
A sounder basis for determining the appropriate benefit value is
not to make appeals to one of these two equity considerations, or
to speculate on how the willingness to pay to reduce risks actually
varies with age. One possibility is to use labor market estimates of
how the VSL varies with age. 0 9 Early studies in this vein imposed
cusi & ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES], available at http://www.rff.org/docu-
ments/RFF-DP-06-12.pdf.
105. EPA, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM 2003, supra note 102, at 64.
106. Viscusi ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 782.
107. See Seelye & Tiemey, supra note 101, at A34.
108. See id.
109. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 7; see generally Viscusl &
ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104.
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empirical constraints on the VSL-age relationship that did not per-
mit the relationship to be flexible, with the result that they esti-
mated VSL to be a decreasing function of the worker's age.110
More recent studies have made more refined attempts to explore
the age variations in VSL. A recent paper by Viscusi and Aldy has
used age-specific fatality rates to explore how labor market premi-
ums for fatality risks vary with worker age.11 ' Although the VSL
does display an inverted U-shaped relationship with respect to in-
dividual age, for the oldest worker group examined, those who
were aged fifty-five to sixty-two, the VSL remains substantial and
is on the order of $6 million.1 2
Another study of labor market variations in VSL with respect to
age by Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak has focused on how recogniz-
ing the life-cycle pattern of consumption affects one's age-adjusted
estimates of VSL." 3 Individual affluence rises over time, as does
individual consumption, with the peak value occurring around age
fifty.' 14 This relationship in turn influences the life-cycle pattern of
VSL.1 5 While the VSL does in fact display an inverted U-shaped
pattern, the pattern for older age groups is relatively flat."a6 Their
estimates of the VSL for the oldest age group that they studied,
those fifty-seven to sixty-five, indicated that using age-adjusted es-
timates of the VSL may actually increase estimated benefits rather
than decrease them, if the estimates for fifty-seven to sixty-five
year olds are reflective of the VSL for those over age sixty-five."17
What these studies suggest is that arbitrary reductions in VSL for
different groups in society should be based on empirical evidence
rather than on conjectures about how these values differ across so-
ciety. In this instance, the role of age is quite complex, given that
one's resources and attitudes toward risk change over time, just as
does one's remaining life expectancy. Overall, willingness to pay to
reduce risks of death does not decline proportionally with one's
expected remaining lifetime." 8
110. For a review of these studies, see Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note
38, at 50.
111. See generally Viscusi & ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104.
112. Id. at 12-13.
113. See generally Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & James P. Ziliak, Life-
Cycle Consumption and the Age-Adjusted Value of Life, 5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1 (2006).
114. Id. at 2, 26-27.
115. See generally id.
116. Id. at 26.
117. Id. at 27.
118. Viscusi & ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104, at 15-17.
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Notwithstanding the lack of strong evidence for a substantial se-
nior discount, there still remains the practical task of how to value
different lifespans. Suppose an air pollution regulation will extend
the lives of those with advanced respiratory disease by only two
months? Surely, a VSL of $7 million is too high. Developing
meaningful estimates for such a population's willingness to pay for
reduced risks to life remains an open challenge, as does the devel-
opment of meaningful VSL levels for children.
Should Income Levels Matter?
The operative benefit principle is society's willingness to pay,
which in turn is intrinsically linked to people's ability to pay. Are
we troubled by the fact that poor people have a different risk-cost
tradeoff than do the more affluent? It is for good reason that the
appropriate benefit measure is linked to people's willingness to
pay, in that this willingness-to-pay measure is a reflection of their
actual preferences. 119 Engaging in thought experiments about
what regulations poor people would prefer if they had the same
income as Bill Gates or that of a government official making over
$100,000 per year will, of course, lead us to different policy choices,
but these will not be choices that enhance the welfare of the poor
as they perceive it. It is likely that none of my colleagues at their
current income levels would find boosting their income by moon-
lighting doing high-rise construction work to be an attractive ven-
ture. Indeed, it is doubtful that I could find many recruits for any
blue-collar job, but the fact that these positions are not in accord
with their preferences does not mean that the welfare of those in
these positions would be enhanced if we banned all employment in
jobs that did not provide for the same safety levels that we experi-
ence as law school professors.
As a practical matter, distinctions based on income have played
a much less prominent role in regulatory contexts than in the
courts.120 The present value of lost earnings approach yields valua-
tions that are proportional to income. If one recognized the posi-
tive income elasticity of VSL, then there would be a 0.5 to 0.6
elasticity of VSL with respect to income. 121 However, I know of no
policy context in which there has ever been an attempt to distin-
119. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1942-43.
120. The present value of lost earnings by definition is proportional to income.
OMB guidelines for regulatory analysis, such as OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16,
make no provision for income differences.
121. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 37.
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guish VSL based on income levels. Rather, the same average VSL
is applied to all benefits, with the result being that there is implicit
redistribution to those who have a lower VSL.122
One context in which I have confronted this distributional con-
cern is with respect to airline safety. In my work through a consult-
ing firm that contracted to the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), I analyzed what VSL should be used to assess airline
safety. Because airline passengers are more affluent than the aver-
age person killed in auto crashes, I recommended that the FAA be
permitted to regulate airline safety more stringently than highway
safety, and I coupled that suggestion with a broader recommenda-
tion that the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) raise the
value of life that it applies throughout the agency.123 Although my
recommendation that the FAA be permitted to use a different
value of life than elsewhere in the DOT was not adopted, the DOT
has raised the value-of-life benefit figure that it uses for regulatory
policy purposes.124
It is useful to articulate what I believe should be a general princi-
ple with respect to the treatment of income differences. In the case
of airline safety regulations, the issue is whether the government
should mandate that airlines install particular kinds of safety equip-
ment, such as floor lighting, fabrics with reduced flammability, and
similar improvements to aircraft safety that passengers cannot
monitor readily. 125 Federal funds are not used to pay for these im-
provements, as these are simply regulatory policies imposing safety
requirements on airlines. 26 These costs in turn would be transmit-
ted to airline passengers through higher prices. Thus, because in
the airline safety case it is not the government's money that pays
for the safety measure but rather the passengers themselves who
ultimately will bear the costs, the impetus for designing regulations
122. I have, however, been present at EPA meetings in which policymakers have
argued that EPA policies should be accorded a higher VSL for benefit assessment
because the risks are involuntary, as compared to the risks workers assume on the job.
123. The recommendation was made in a meeting I had with FAA officials and
representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. The proposed adjust-
ments for income level appear in the final column of Table 4 of Viscusi, Value of
Risks, supra note 15, at 1930, 1932-33.
124. Table 1, infra, documents the change over time in the FAA value of life
figures.
125. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec.
1986, at 25, 102 [hereinafter Morrall, Review of the Record].
126. Those requirements are regulatory constraints, not government expenditure
programs. See, e.g., Protective Breathing Equipment, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,452 (proposed
Oct. 10, 1985) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121).
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that reflect the tradeoffs passengers would likely make if they were
informed about the safety of airlines is consistent with their prefer-
ences. If airline safety instead was being funded through general
tax revenues rather than through higher ticket prices, then the case
for applying a differential value of life would be less compelling. In
the case of highway safety policies that are broadly funded by
states and the federal government, there may be an efficiency ra-
tionale for making highways safer in Beverly Hills than in Detroit,
but because these efforts are publicly funded and not the result of a
private bargain compelled through government regulation, the eq-
uity case for such differential values of life is not as strong.
Based on this analysis of the role of income differences, how
then should we treat the following stylized version of lifeboat ac-
cess on the Titanic? Suppose that, at the time you purchased your
ticket for the voyage, you were offered the opportunity to purchase
a separate ticket to be in a lifeboat, should an emergency arise.
This kind of market situation is unusual, as typically there are indi-
visibilities in the provision of safety equipment for airplanes, as
regulatory measures such as floor lighting will benefit those in
coach as well as those in first class. One would expect the more
affluent passengers to purchase those tickets because of their
higher value of statistical life.127 These purchases would be private
contracts, and would reflect the preferences of the people who
chose to purchase the ticket or who chose to forgo such a purchase.
The difficulty with this market is that at the time of the ticket
purchase, the individual is purchasing a reduction in the small
probability of death, whereas at the time the ticket is cashed in for
the ride in the lifeboat, death is a certainty for those who do not get
a lifeboat seat, as opposed to a low probability lottery. The previ-
ous market bargains are likely to be untenable at the time the ship
is sinking.
Benefit Values Used by Government Agencies
Many government agencies utilize value-of-life estimates that
are usually based on my earlier inventory of the VSL studies in the
literature. 128 Table 1 provides a listing of sixteen different regula-
tory analyses and the pertinent values of life used to assess these
benefits.12 9 The VSL numbers range from a low of $1 million, used
by the FAA in 1985, to a high of $6.3 million, used in many analy-
127. See supra text accompanying note 123.
128. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1942-43.
129. See infra tbl.1; see also Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 55.
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ses performed by the EPA.13° Note that there has been a general
increase in the valuations used over time, as the FAA value of life
number in 1996 is greater than the number used by that agency in
1988, which in turn is greater than the number used in 1985.''
Although regulatory agencies are often quite diligent in calculat-
ing benefits and in comparing benefits and costs, because of their
restrictive legislative mandates many regulations issued generate
fewer benefits than costs. 132 One measure of the cost effectiveness
of regulations is the cost per statistical life saved. 133 As the inven-
tory prepared by John Morrall for the OMB indicates, many regu-
lations impose costs per life saved well in excess of the $7 million
VSL figure. 34 Regulations from OSHA and the EPA are particu-
larly likely to be above that level, with some regulations costing
more than $100 million per expected life saved.135 Morrall's 2003
analysis updates his widely-cited 1986 table in which he showed
that many regulations fail such an efficacy test because of the high
cost per life saved.136 That table included regulations that were
promulgated as well as those that had been proposed and rejected,
and Morrall indicated the final status of all entries in the table. 37
In terms of the overall assessment for regulatory practice, agen-
cies calculate benefits, but estimated benefits are often less than
the cost.138 Transportation safety regulations are an exception;
these regulations, however, are not ideal because the DOT has
long used a VSL figure that is below the prevailing market esti-
mates of VSL.1 39 My hypothesis is that the agency may be suffer-
ing from an anchoring bias in that it had historically used the
present value of lost earnings figures applied in automobile acci-
130. See infra tbl.1.
131. See id.
132. See generally John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 221 (2003) [hereinafter Morrall, Saving Lives].
133. See id. at 223-24 tbl.1.
134. See id.
135. See Morrall, Review of the Record, supra note 125, at 30.
136. See id. at 25-34; see also Morrall, Saving Lives, supra note 132, at 223-24 tbl.1.
137. Somewhat curiously, even though Morrall's table included a footnote indicat-
ing which were the regulations that had been rejected, he has been criticized for not
indicating which of the regulations in the list had been rejected. The same critics who
voiced this complaint reproduced Morrall's table omitting the original footnote that
listed which regulations were simply proposed, which had been rejected, and which
were final rules. The reproduction of the Morrall table omitting this footnote appears
in ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2. Compare Morrall, Review of the Re-
cord, supra note 125, at 102, with ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 46.
138. See generally Morrall, Saving Lives, supra note 132.
139. See infra tbl.1.
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dent cases to value lives, and that subsequent changes have been
incremental.
The problem of inadequate attention to balancing benefits and
costs also pertains to other government policies that are not re-
quired to go through the rule-making process. The cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites under the Superfund program has been
particularly telling in that regard."' The average cost expended
per case of cancer averted is over $6 billion, based on an extensive
study that James T. Hamilton and I did of a very large number of
hazardous waste sites mandated for cleanup by EPA.' 4' This prof-
ligacy is due in part to the absence of any economic efficiency re-
quirement as well as the way in which EPA assesses risk benefits.142
Hypothetically exposed future populations receive the same weight
as do current populations exposed to the risk. The result is that
cleanups often target areas where there are very few people actu-
ally at risk, thus diverting resources from sites where real risks to
existing populations could be reduced."' 3 Thus, sites with low risk
reduction benefits are treated the same as sites where benefits
would be greater if they were estimated properly. 144
What Hamilton and I have shown is that the cost per case of
cancer prevented is much lower at sites in which a large segment of
the exposed population consists of lower-income minorities.' 45
Thus, targeting cleanups based on cost effectiveness from an eco-
nomic standpoint would help the poor, as compared to the current
cleanup strategy. 146 Thus, the claim that there is a tradeoff be-
tween efficiency and equity in this instance is a false characteriza-
tion of the policy problem, as greater attention to efficiency
enhances environmental equity.' 47
Stated Preference Approaches 148
In situations in which market data are not readily available,
economists have frequently used contingent valuation or stated
140. See JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. Kip Viscusi, CALCULATING RISKS? THE SPA-
TIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 109-10 (1999).
141. See id. at 125.
142. Id. at 25-57.
143. Id. at 56-57.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 182.
146. Id. at 176-86.
147. Id. at 188.
148. For discussion of some stated preference methods, the widespread use of
stated preference approaches in the federal government, and criteria for sound stated
preference studies, see OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 22-24.
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preference models to elicit people's willingness to pay for various
risk and environmental outcomes.149 These survey techniques have
addressed a wide variety of outcomes. Among the health out-
comes that have been valued are the saving of lives of post-heart
attack victims, reduction of airline fatalities, throat congestion,
headaches, bleach poisonings, skin poisonings, toilet bowl cleaner
gassings, child poisonings, nerve disease, nonfatal lymphoma, and
severe chronic bronchitis. 50
These survey methods achieved substantial prominence with re-
spect to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. To assess natural resource dam-
ages, economists on behalf of the state of Alaska and on behalf of
the U.S. Department of Justice ran surveys to determine the value
that people place on such oil spills. 51 I was a consultant and expert
witness for the U.S. Department of Justice and National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration team.
These methodologies have aroused considerable controversy,
stimulated in large part by the substantial stakes of the Exxon
Valdez litigation. 52 Economists funded by Exxon criticized the
contingent valuation approach because survey estimates did not
satisfy basic principles of rationality. 153 Thus, for example, people
should be willing to pay more to save 10,000 birds than to save 100
birds, whereas surveys suggested that people were not responsive
149. See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is
Some Number Better Than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 45.
150. A review of these health-related studies appears in Viscusi, Value of Risks,
supra note 15, at 1940-41. For a wide range of EPA studies of these and other related
benefits matters, see National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Publications, [hereinafter EPA STUDIES] http://yosemite.
epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Publications.html. For an example of EPA's use of
my chronic bronchitis research, see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990 TO 2010, at H-15 (1999), ("[T]he valuation of
chronic bronchitis is based on the distribution of WTP responses from Viscusi et al.
(1991).") (citing W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat & Joel Huber, Pricing Environmen-
tal Health Risks: Survey Assessments of Risk-Risk and Risk-Dollar Trade-Offs for
Chronic Bronchitis, 21 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 32 (1991) [hereinafter Viscusi et al.,
Environmental Health Risks]) available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect8l2/1990-2010/
fullrept.pdf. The chronic bronchitis analysis makes an adjustment to willingness to
pay to account for the less severe nature of the chronic bronchitis cases reduced by
the Clean Air Act. This value has become the standard chronic bronchitis valuation
figure for air rules related to particulate matter.
151. See VIscusi ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 780. For
the original report on the State of Alaska analysis of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, see
RICHARD T. CARSON ET AL., A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY OF LOST PASSIVE
USE VALUES RESULTING FROM THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL (1992), http://www.
rff.org/-kopp/Reports/contingentvaluation.pdf.
152. See Diamond & Hausman, supra note 149, at 51 n.10.
153. See id. at 51 n.10, 52-53.
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to the scope of the commodity being saved.154 Somewhat surpris-
ingly, left-wing critics of the stated preference methodology, such
as Ackerman and Heinzerling, have allied themselves with these
corporate critiques and expressed a substantial skepticism of the
use of such survey methods.155 Presumably these same critics who
opposed the use of stated preference methods for regulatory analy-
sis would not also have opposed the use of survey techniques to
determine the natural resource damages caused by the Exxon
Valdez oil spill if survey methods were the only means for develop-
ing such an estimate.
Since the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill debate, there has
been considerable progress in the development of survey method-
ologies, and these developments make it possible to overcome the
earlier shortcomings. OMB, for example, has outlined the criteria
that such stated preference methods should satisfy in order to de-
velop credible estimates.156 These guidelines include accurate
characterization of the good being purchased by the respondent,
and a credible payment mechanism. 157
For the past eight years, Joel Huber and I have been developing
survey techniques to value what the benefit to the country is of
clean lakes, rivers, and streams. Using a nationally representative
sample of thousands of respondents, we found that people were
able to give quite consistent answers that passed a wide variety of
rationality tests. 158 Unlike the 100 birds being equivalent to 10,000
birds phenomenon found in the surveys from over a decade ago,
our survey structure yielded results in which more environmental
quality was consistently preferred to less. 5 9 Similarly, lower costs
for environmental improvement were consistently preferred to
154. See, e.g., id. at 51-52; see also William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural
Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CON-
TINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993).
155. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 94-98. For a recent response
to the Ackerman and Heinzerling critique, see the article by EPA senior economist
Alan Carlin, The New Challenge to Cost-Benefit Analysis, REGULATION, Fall 2005, at
18, 20.
156. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 22-23.
157. For more discussion of these criteria, see id. at 23.
158. W. KIP Viscusi & JOEL HUBER, HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING OF PUBLIC
GooDs 8 (2005), http://www.aeaweb.org/annual-mtg-papers/2006/0107_1015-1103.
pdf.
159. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Joel Huber & Jason Bell, The Value of Regional
Water Quality Improvements (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law
Sch., Faculty Discussion Paper Series No. 477, 2004) [hereinafter Viscusi et al., Water
Quality Improvements], available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-
center/papers/pdf/477.pdf.
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higher costs. 160 Responses to the survey also passed complicated
dominance tests, as subjects preferred alternatives on two dimen-
sions that were dominant choices from an economic standpoint. 161
In addition to passing these various rationality tests, the study
also met OMB's criteria for sound survey design, and OMB ap-
proved every pretest and final field version of the survey. The sur-
vey text defined the commodity to be valued-improvements in
water quality-in great detail so that respondents would under-
stand the good. The payment mechanism of higher cost of living
after moving to a new region was also well understood and was a
credible payment vehicle.
The survey methodology we used was a series of iterative choices
that parallels the approach we used in other studies, such as the
chronic bronchitis analysis that has been used for benefit assess-
ment purposes by the EPA.1 62 Since there seems to be some mis-
understanding on the part of people such as Ackerman and
Heinzerling as to how the interview structure works, it is worth-
while to elaborate a bit on the survey methodology. 163 Figure 1
provides a sample water quality benefit valuation question.1 64
The individual has a choice between two regions, as region 2 of-
fers a greater level of water quality that is rated good but at an
annual cost of living of an additional $200.165 Respondents who did
not express indifference to a first choice such as this considered a
series of four subsequent choices, including a final dominated
choice. Individuals who failed to pass the dominance test were la-
beled "inconsistent," and people who hit the corners of the valua-
tion task tree were not achieving indifference and had implied
values that would be estimated statistically.
Only five percent of the respondents gave inconsistent responses
to the series of iterative choice questions that forced respondents
to consider tradeoffs between cost of living and water quality in
160. See id.
161. An example of a dominated alternative is that a policy improvement of fifteen
percent in water quality for $200 is dominated by an improvement of twenty percent
for $200. Rational respondents should prefer a twenty percent improvement to a fif-
teen percent improvement if they are both equally costly.
162. See generally Viscusi et al., Environmental Health Risks, supra note 150.
163. In particular, they claim that only two-thirds of the respondents were able to
understand the interview. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 96. The
one-third figure includes people who were not only inconsistent but also includes peo-
ple who hit the corners of the iterative choice decision structure, and consequently
does not reflect people who did not understand the interview structure. See id.
164. See infra fig.1; see also Viscusi & HUBER, supra note 158, at 33.
165. See infra fig.1.
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FIGURE 1. SAMPLE PRIVATE WATER QUALITY
BENEFIT QUESTION
We would like to ask you some more questions like these. In these questions,
however, one region will have a lower annual cost of living and the other will have
higher water quality. REMEMBER THAT THE NATIONAL AVERAGE FOR WATER
QUALITY is 65% GOOD.
Region 1 Region 2
Increase in $100 $300
Annual Cost Of More More
Living Expensive Expensive
Percent of Lake 40% 60%
Acres and River Good Good
Miles With Water Water
Good Quality Quality
Water Quality
Which Region Region 1* Region 2* No Preference*
Would you
Prefer?
pairwise regional choices.166 Based on the initial choice, respon-
dents' valuations are bounded from above or below depending on
whether they pick the high cost of living-higher water quality re-
gion or the low cost of living-lower water quality region. Respon-
dents are then given a series of iterative choices to refine their
answers further. Of these, eventually 3,254 of our respondents
reached a point of indifference regarding the choices presented to
them, while 403 respondents continued to prefer the high water
quality option, and 346 continued to prefer the lower cost of living
option. The fact that there are 749 respondents who are at the cor-
ners of this sequential decision choice does not imply that they did
not understand the interview, or that the methodology was unsuc-
cessful. Using two-limit Tobit estimates, it is feasible to estimate
what their responses would have been had the iterative choice pro-
cess continued indefinitely; the procedure estimates the value of
water quality for the sample by, in effect, taking into account what
the responses would be had they not hit the upper limit in the sur-
vey structure. Quite interestingly, these Tobit results were quite
stable across the various iterations, implying mean valuations of
$31 for each unit increase in water quality improvement in a 90-
mile radius of one's home region.
166. The results below are based on unpublished computer runs for our ongoing
analysis of water quality benefits for the EPA.
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EPA and other agencies continue to rely on stated preference
methodologies because benefit assessment is quite central to the
policy valuation process. 67 In a world of limited resources, eventu-
ally tradeoffs must be made, and the monetization of these benefits
serves to put these quite disparate commodities in comparable
terms.
What Should Get Monetized? Real Versus Imaginary Benefits
An interesting policy problem stimulated in part by a question
posed by Paul Portney is the weight that people should place on
real benefits as opposed to imaginary benefits.168 Consider the fol-
lowing variant on his Happyville problem. Suppose that there are
two risks facing a population. The first chemical exposure actually
imposes negligible cancer risk, but people believe the risk to be
one in 1000. The second chemical actually does pose a risk, and
people accurately assess this risk as being one in 10,000. Because
the population in this town is 10,000, people believe that the ex-
pected number of deaths that could be prevented by addressing the
first risk is ten, where in fact it is zero, while the expected number
of deaths from the second chemical is one. If the cost of cleanup is
identical for both chemicals and there are only sufficient funds to
clean up one of these two chemicals, recognition of the primary
role of citizen sovereignty would clearly lead to addressing the im-
aginary risk from chemical one and ignoring the real risk from
chemical two.
The broader question raised by this example for benefits assess-
ment is the extent to which the government should monetize imagi-
nary risks as opposed to real risks. The fact that people have
irrational fears does not seem to warrant the calculation of any
health benefit, although there might be some small benefit in terms
of anxiety reduction that might be better addressed through an in-
formational campaign rather than squandering resources. The
principle I will advocate here is that monetization of benefits
should be restricted to placing dollar values on the estimates of the
expected number of lives saved based on scientific evidence rather
than on public perceptions. For the same kinds of reasons that we
would not want to ignore risks that are not known to the public,
such as the hidden dangers of occupational carcinogens, we would
167. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
168. For Portney's conjecture, see Paul R. Portney, Trouble in Happyville, 11 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 131, 131-32 (1992).
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also not want to misallocate resources by addressing risks that the
public believes to be greater than is actually the case.
In some instances, government agencies may foster excessive
emphasis on these imaginary risks. As noted above, by focusing on
risks to hypothetical future populations, the EPA often places un-
due emphasis on imaginary risks that will never come to pass. 1 69
Justice Stephen Breyer recounts an example of a case in his court
in which a Superfund site was clean enough for children to play on
the site and eat small amounts of dirt for seventy days a year, but
after that site was cleaned up, children would be able to eat the dirt
for 245 days per year. 170 Justice Breyer was puzzled because "there
were no dirt-eating children playing in the area, for it was a swamp.
Nor were dirt-eating children likely to appear there, for future
building seemed unlikely.' 7 1 This excessive focus on imaginary
risks rather than real risks distorts our priorities and actually has a
perverse distribution effect.
Risk-Risk Analysis
When monetizing the benefits of government policies, it is essen-
tial to monetize the net health and safety benefits, not the gross
benefits. There may be a variety of benefit offsets, such as de-
creased consumer precautions in the presence of safety caps, which
I termed the "lulling effect.' 72 There also could be ancillary safety
benefits, as hypothesized by Rascoff and Revesz. 173
The focus here will be on the concept of risk-risk analysis in the
sense of health-risk increases that result from the opportunity costs
of policy expenditures. The underlying principle is that being
richer is healthier, as there is a positive income elasticity of health
and safety levels.174 Judge Stephen Williams brought the risk-risk
concept to the forefront of the policy debate, when he observed
that very expensive OSHA regulations could lead to a net decrease
169. See id.
170. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 12 (1993).
171. Id.
172. See, for example, my discussion in Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45,
at 12, 224-27.
173. See generally Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk
Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regula-
tion, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763 (2002).
174. The first documentation of this relationship in the professional literature is W.
Kip Viscusi, Wealth Effects and Earnings Premiums for Job Hazards, 60 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 408 (1978).
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in safety.175 The rationale is that very high levels of expenditure
represent an opportunity cost and take money away from consum-
ers that could otherwise be used for health-enhancing expendi-
tures, such as health care, safer products, and safer
neighborhoods.'76 Although Judge Williams focused on existing
published estimates that indicated that expenditures of under $10
million per life saved could be counterproductive, low estimates
appear to be implausible, since it is unlikely that expenditures com-
parable to the value of statistical life could reduce safety levels. 77
On a theoretical basis there should be a linkage between the value
of life from the standpoint of prevention and the level of expendi-
ture that leads to the loss of a statistical life.17 8 In particular, I
showed that the marginal expenditure per statistical life lost equals
the VSL divided by the marginal propensity to spend on health
from one's income. 179 If we focus only on health-enhancing ex-
penditures, then the marginal propensity to spend on health is ap-
proximately 0.1, so that the level of expenditure that will lead to
the loss of a statistical life is $70 million if the value of life is $7
million. s0 Higher levels of expenditure may also lead to consump-
tion that harms oneself.1 81 Recognizing these influences leads to a
lower estimate of the expenditure level per life saved that would be
counterproductive. 182
A set of examples in Table 2 illustrates that recognition of risk-
risk tradeoffs affects the estimates of benefits. 183 For that series of
regulations, the authors calculate the net lives saved by regulations,
taking into account the risk-risk tradeoffs. 84 To monetize the ben-
efits of these regulations, one could then apply the VSL of $7 mil-
175. See Int'l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Wil-
liams, J., concurring).
176. See id.
177. For an example of the kind of risk-risk analysis cited by Judge Williams, see
Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANAL-
Ysis 147 (1990).
178. See Randall Lutter, John F. Morrall III & W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-
Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599, 605 (1999).
179. See id.
180. See id. Using an estimated VSL of $5 million, that article concluded that an
expenditure of $15 million will lead to the loss of a statistical life. Use of a $7 million
VSL figure rather than a $5 million figure will increase that estimate proportionately.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See infra tbl.2; see also ROBERT W. HAHN, RANDALL W. LUTrER & W. Kip
Viscusi, Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? 16-17 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter HAHN ET AL., REDUCE MORTALITY].
184. See HAHN ET AL., REDUCE MORTALITY, supra note 183, at 16-17.
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lion to the net lives saved figure, which will produce an estimate of
the net monetary safety benefits resulting from the regulation. As
indicated in the table, many of these health and safety regulations
are counterproductive in terms of their net effects on health and
safety.185
Although the "richer is safer" argument may appear to be
counterintuitive, the following example shows the mechanisms at
work. Suppose that regulatory policy was no more productive than
paying people to dig ditches and fill them back up again. This level
of efficacy is not too far removed from many of the most inefficient
regulations. By diverting consumer expenditures through taxes,
higher prices, or lower wages from the usual bundle of consump-
tion goods, such a ditch-digging policy will impose net health costs
through the opportunity costs of the money being expended.
Ackerman and Heinzerling criticize this risk-risk approach and
express puzzlement that advocates of the risk-risk methodology
have never suggested applying this methodology to other types of
expenditure, such as military spending.186 The genesis of the risk-
risk methodology in policy contexts stems from the fact that regula-
tory agencies such as OSHA and EPA have a myopic risk-oriented
approach.187 Unlike other government policies, risk regulation
costs do not come out of general revenues, so there are no internal
budgetary restrictions. 88 If cost does not enter policy evaluations
on equal footing with benefits, or possibly not count at all because
of agencies' restrictive legislative mandates, then in the extreme
case the only scorecard component that matters is how a regulation
performs from a risk standpoint. What the risk-risk methodology
points out is that even if all we are about is health and safety with
cost as a matter of complete indifference, truly wasteful expendi-
tures on regulations are still not advancing that objective. Thus, it
provides a way to open the policy debate to evaluate truly ineffec-
tive policies in situations in which only risk effects seem to be of
concern to policymakers.
To the best of my knowledge, a purely health-and-safety score-
card is not used outside of the risk and environmental regulation
arena. If, however, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
185. Id. at 19.
186. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 59.
187. In some instances, costs cannot be considered at all. See Viscusi, FATAL
TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 261.
188. As a result there have been proposals that agencies be subject to a regulatory
budget, as discussed in W. Kip Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND
SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 152-55 (1983).
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Services were to fund healthcare programs that saved statistical
lives at a cost of $100 million per life, then the same type of argu-
ment regarding the counterproductive nature of such expenditures
would be pertinent. Exorbitant expenditures on health and safety
do not have a net beneficial effect on health.
Monetizing Benefits for Policy
A substantial dividend from the monetization of the benefits
from risk and environmental regulation is that doing so has placed
these benefits on equal footing with the quite tangible costs of
these regulations. These benefits no longer are subsidiary qualita-
tive considerations. 89 The importance of valuing benefits and the
extent to which placing such benefits on an equitable basis with
costs is apparent based on the history of regulatory oversight of
new government regulations. 19°
The original regulatory oversight process was only concerned
with costs, not benefits. 191 Costs were tangible monetary losses,
while benefits were seemingly nebulous and more abstract environ-
mental amenities.' 92 The Nixon administration initiated informal
"quality of life" reviews that focused on the cost of impact regula-
tions on the economy. 193 The Ford administration formalized this
process through Executive Order 11,821, which required agencies
to prepare inflationary impact analyses of the costs of these regula-
tions.194 Once again, all that mattered were the monetized costs,
not the benefits, even though these also potentially could be trans-
lated into monetary terms. 195
The Carter administration regulatory oversight effort of Execu-
tive Order 12,044 expanded the requirements to include cost-effec-
tiveness tests. 196 The agency had to show that it was achieving the
189. RICHARD L. BERKMAN & W. Kip Viscusi, DAMMING THE WEST: RALPH NA-
DER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 75 (1973).
190. The documentation of the history based on the discussion below appears in
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24-33.
191. See id. at 24.
192. This observation is based on my experience in supervising all new major fed-
eral regulation from 1979-1980 as Deputy Director of the President's Council on
Wage and Price Stability.
193. VISCUsI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24.
194. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 29, 1974); see also ViscUsi
ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24.
195. See VIsCUsI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24.
196. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 23, 1978); see also VIscUsi
ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 25.
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particular benefits of the regulation for the least possible cost.1 97
As with the Ford administration program, this regulatory effort
was run by the White House Council on Wage and Price Stability,
for which I was the Deputy Director. The main focus remained on
costs and inflationary impact of regulation, though the concerns
were expanded to include cost effectiveness. Perhaps because of
this emphasis, the kinds of monetization that are the focus of my
paper were not yet undertaken by regulatory agencies. For exam-
ple, agencies did not use VSL to value the benefits of regulatory
efforts or undertake stated preference surveys to determine the
value of environmental amenities.
Once the Reagan administration required that agencies demon-
strate that the benefits of regulation exceeded the costs, agencies
could either quantify the cost effects in monetary terms and com-
pare them to the risk and environmental benefits described in a
qualitative manner, or they could explore more innovative ap-
proaches to try to capture the extent to which there were real and
tangible benefits from these regulatory efforts. 198 As I indicated in
my discussion of the OSHA hazard communication regulation,
OSHA began using my value-of-life estimates beginning in 1982, in
part because this methodology greatly enhanced the attractiveness
of regulatory policies, given the substantial benefits this economic
approach accorded to reducing risks to human life. 199 Perhaps for
much the same reason, the EPA has been at the forefront of devel-
oping and funding research efforts to place a dollar value on envi-
ronmental amenities, ranging from improved visibility of the
Grand Canyon to the value that improvements of water quality will
have to people who do not even use bodies of water for fishing,
swimming, or other recreational purposes. °0
The development of new techniques for monetizing benefits has
led to new controversies, both because the empirical methods
themselves remain in the process of development, and because
there has been an effort to extend and refine the estimates in a
variety of ways. In the case of valuing statistical lives, use of
these numbers is no longer regarded as controversial by regulatory
agencies, as their application in benefit assessments has become
197. VIScusI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 25.
198. See id. at 27.
199. As discussed above, these value-of-life estimates led to an OSHA regulation
being assessed as having benefits in excess of costs, whereas the earlier approach led
to the opposite conclusion. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
200. See EPA STUDIES, supra note 150.
201. See Carlin, supra note 155, at 20.
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routine. The issues that are now at the forefront of the policy
agenda involve refinements in how such values can be applied.
Most notably, the debate over whether there should be a senior
discount for the value placed on the lives of the elderly for the
Clear Skies Initiative exemplifies the extent to which there are
clearly contentious issues arising from the application of different
values for different segments of the population.2 °2 My past work
indicates that the magnitude of age differences in VSL is not that
substantial, and that the policy debate should not become mired in
such subsidiary controversies.20 3 The more fundamental challenge
is to strike a reasonable overall balance between cost and risk.20 4
Engaging in more contentious debates regarding the differences in
the value of life across segments of the population seems prema-
ture given that more fundamental lack of benefit-cost balance in
regulatory policies.20 5
A substantial dividend from the monetization of risk and envi-
ronmental regulatory impacts is that this process links these bene-
fits to the fundamental economic determinants of benefit values,
which is the willingness to pay of those affected by a regulation for
the effects of these policies.20 6 In the case of VSL, these estimates
are typically derived from the preferences that workers reveal
through their risky job choices and the wage premiums they re-
ceive for risk.20 7 In the case of other environmental benefits, the
main focus has been on a variety of stated preference approaches
that elicit measures of the willingness to pay for the environmental
benefit.20 8 By their very nature, the valuations derived from mar-
ket evidence will reflect preferences of the citizenry.
The advent of stated preference methods has in turn created new
components of benefits that could substantially loom large in the
benefit assessment process. Perhaps the most controversial benefit
component is that of nonuse or passive use of an environmental
202. See Christine Todd Whitman, Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Statement at
the Aging Initiative Public Listening Session (May 7, 2003) (renouncing the senior
discount), http://www.epa.gov/aging/listening/2003/baltctw.htm.
203. Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 30.
204. See id. at 31-32.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 17.
207. Id. at 42-49.
208. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
THE FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE, at ES-3, http://www.epa.gov/ttncaaal/tlria.html
(follow "Executive Summary" hyperlink).
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resource.20 9 Historically, economists valued the use of improved
environmental resources through the recreational value of, or the
travel costs that people incurred to visit the environmental site.
The use of stated preference approaches has greatly expanded the
scope of such benefits to include the value of benefits to people
who do not even directly use the environmental amenity. 210 Thus,
in the case of water quality benefits, people who do not fish, visit
recreational areas, or picnic at these rivers or lakes may neverthe-
less express fairly substantial values for improvements in water
quality in their region as well as elsewhere in the country.21' Non-
use benefits are legitimate but often difficult to measure, making
this benefit category a prime target of critics of regulatory poli-
cies. 212 As with market-based estimates, these elicited values will
reflect the willingness to pay of the citizenry. 213 The scope of the
benefits that can be captured through the monetization of environ-
mental benefits is quite broad and is not limited to the kinds of
activities for which one normally conceives that a market arrange-
ment might be appropriate.214
Put somewhat differently, any regulatory benefit from a risk reg-
ulation or environmental regulation that should be legitimately
recognized in the policy analysis process can potentially be quanti-
fied in monetary terms. Doing so will enable these benefits to re-
flect the values of the people who are affected by the regulation
rather than the preferences of policymakers who would otherwise
seek to impose their own values on the citizenry.
My support for the monetization of environmental benefits be-
gan over three decades ago with my involvement as co-author of a
Nader study group study analyzing the dam building efforts of the
209. See Richard T. Carson et al., Was the NOAA Panel Correct About Contingent
Valuation? (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 96-20, 1996), available at http://
www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-96-20.pdf.
210. See, e.g., Viscusi et al., Water Quality Improvements, supra note 159, at 12 (not-
ing that nonusers are permitted to value water quality, but people who visit lakes and
rivers have a higher value).
211. Users have a twenty-eight percent higher value. Id.
212. SUSAN E. DUDLEY & BRIAN F. MANNIX, MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON
UNIV., PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET'S DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND
THE FORMAT OF ACCOUNTING STATEMENTS 10-13 (2003), https://www.mercatus.org/
pdf/materials/314.pdf
213. If the survey sample consists of populations reflective of the preferences of
those affected by the policy, this will be true.
214. For example, valuation of water quality in Viscusi et al., Water Quality Im-
provements, supra note 159, does not deal with water being sold.
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U.S. Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation.2 1 5 That
agency could only undertake policies for which the benefits ex-
ceeded the costs. Quantified benefits such as irrigation and electric
power were tallied, but environmental consequences were not,
with the result being that they were largely ignored. As our report
concluded:
Why shouldn't environmental consequences of Reclamation
projects also be given dollar values? Without such considera-
tion, "tangible benefits" such as irrigation or power overshadow
ecological effects. For example, in the 1960s the Bureau of Rec-
lamation wanted to flood major portions of the Grand Canyon
by building Bridge Canyon and Marble Canyon dams on the
Colorado. As usual, the Bureau paid lip service to environmen-
tal considerations in the narrative section of its project reports.
However, when it came to placing dollar values on project ef-
fects, environmental impacts weren't mentioned at all and
played no part in the benefit-cost evaluation. Consequently, the
Bureau of Reclamation added up the "tangible" benefits and
costs of its projects, found that the dollar value of benefits ex-
ceeded the estimated costs, concluded that the projects were ec-
onomically justified, and sent them on to Congress.216
How, then, did the efforts to dam up the Grand Canyon get
stopped? Economist Dr. Alan Carlin, who is now a senior econo-
mist at the EPA, showed with a co-author that the quantified bene-
fits in fact did not exceed the costs. 217 His analysis, however,
turned not on adverse environmental effects, which were not read-
ily monetized in that era of economic analysis, but on the overesti-
mation of electric power benefits. It may be that Dr. Carlin's
misgivings about the Priceless approach,21 s as well as my own resis-
tance to the Priceless point of view, stems in part from our longer
historical perspective. The government has already run the experi-
ment of analyzing proposed programs with major environmental
effects but not monetizing the environmental consequences. The
result was not that these effects were treated as being "priceless,"
but instead were viewed as being worthless.
215. See BERKMAN & Viscusi, supra note 189.
216. Id. at 75.
217. See id. at 75-76, 91.
218. For Dr. Carlin's views, see Carlin, supra note 155.
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CONCLUSION
The Priceless approach consequently has taken us full circle. In
the early era of policy analyses, there were efforts to quantify bene-
fit components for goods traded in markets, but risk and environ-
mental consequences were not monetized. The result was that
monetized benefits took precedence. After President Reagan re-
quired that new regulations pass a test that benefits exceed costs,
the efforts to monetize risk and environmental effects expanded,
often accompanied by the development of new methodologies to
ascertain society's willingness to pay for risk and environmental
benefits. Efforts to quantify benefit components such as nonuse
values for the environment have long been opposed by industry
groups who are defendants in natural resource damages cases in
which the values are being used to assess damages. Consideration
of nonuse values has also been opposed by conservative critics who
are fearful that these assessments will lead to overly ambitious pol-
icies. The advocates of the Priceless approach have joined forces
with these groups, but from the opposite perspective, arguing that
no finite monetary value is appropriate. Each of these anti-moneti-
zation schools of thought loses sight of the overriding purpose of
policy assessment. The benefit valuation task remains that of de-
termining society's willingness to pay for the policy. Monetization
of benefits remains the soundest approach for doing so in a manner
that will give these effects standing in the regulatory policy process.
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TABLE 1. VALUES OF STATISTICAL LIFE USED BY U.S.
REGULATORY AGENCIES, 1985-2000219
Value of a
Statistical Life
Year Agency Regulation (millions, 2000 $)
1985 Federal Aviation
Administration
1985 Environmental
Protection Agency
1988 Federal Aviation
Administration
1988 Environmental
Protection Agency
1990 Federal Aviation
Administration
1994 Food and Nutrition
Service (USDA)
1995 Consumer Product
Safety Commission
1996 Food Safety
Inspection Service
(USDA)
1996 Food and Drug
Administration
1996 Federal Aviation
Administration
1996 Environmental
Protection Agency
1996 Food and Drug
Administration
1997 Environmental
Protection Agency
1999 Environmental
Protection Agency
1999 Environmental
Protection Agency
2000 Consumer Product
Safety Commission
Protective Breathing Equipment (50 Fed.
Reg. 41,452)
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives;
Gasoline Lead Content (50 Fed. Reg.
9,400)
Improved Survival Equipment for
Inadvertent Water Landings (53 Fed. Reg.
24,890)
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone (53 Fed.
Reg. 30,566)
Proposed Establishment of the Harlingen
Airport Radar Service Area, TX (55 Fed.
Reg. 32,064)
National School Lunch Program and
School Breakfast Program (59 Fed. Reg.
30,218)
Multiple Tube Mine and Shell Fireworks
Devices (60 Fed. Reg. 34,922)
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point Systems (61 Fed.
Reg. 38,806)
Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and
Adolescents (61 Fed. Reg. 44,396)
Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot
Training, Testing, and Checking and at
Training Centers (61 Fed. Reg. 34,508)
Requirements for Lead-Based Paint
Activities in Target Housing and Child-
Occupied Facilities (61 Fed. Reg. 45,778)
Medical Devices; Current Good
Manufacturing Practice Final Rule; Quality
System Regulation (61 Fed. Reg. 52,602)
National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Ozone (62 Fed. Reg. 38,856)
Radon in Drinking Water Health Risk
Reduction and Cost Analysis (64 Fed. Reg.
9,560)
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor
Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control
Requirements (65 Fed. Reg. 6,698)
Portable Bed Rails; Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (65 Fed. Reg.
58,968)
219. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 55.
$1.0
$1.7
$1.5
$4.8
$2.0
$1.7, $3.5
$5.6
$1.9
$2.7
$3.0
$6.3
$5.5
$6.3
$6.3
$3.9, $6.3
$5.0
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TABLE 2. EVALUATION OF RISK-RISK TRADEOFF FOR TWENTY-
FOUR U.S. REGULATIONS, 1986-1998220
Regulation
Toxicity characteristics to determine
hazardous wastes
Underground storage tanks:
technical requirements
Manufactured home construction
and safety standards on wind
standards
Process safety management of
highly hazardous chemicals
Regulations restricting the sale and
distribution of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco to protect
children and adolescents
Medicare and Medicaid programs:
hospital conditions of participation;
identification of potential organ,
tissue, and eye donors; and
transplant hospitals' provision of
transplant-related data
Quality mammography standards
Food labeling regulations
Childproof lighters
Standard for occupational exposure
to benzene
Occupational exposure to
methylene chloride
Occupational exposure to 4,4'
methylenedianiline
Asbestos: manufacture, importation,
processing, and distribution in
commerce-prohibitions (total)
National primary and secondary
water regulations-phase II:
maximum contaminant levels for 38
contaminants
Occupational exposure to asbestos
Hazardous waste management
system-wood preservatives
Sewage sludge use and disposal
regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 503
Land disposal restrictions for "third
third" scheduled wastes
Discounted Fatalities
Statistical Induced by Net Lives
Lives Cost of Saved by
Year Agency Saved Regulations Regulations
1990 EPA 0.048 -23 23
1988 EPA 1.1 -22
1994 HUD 1.5 -3.2 4.7
1992 DOL 220 -42 260
1996 HHS
1998 HHS
4,700 -140 4,900
710 9.2 700
HHS
HHS
CPSC
DOL
1997 DOL 12 5.9 6.2
1992 DOL 0.7 0.71 -0.01
1989 EPA
1991 EPA
1994 DOL
1990 EPA
1993 EPA 0.24
1990 EPA
3.9 4.3 -0.41
2.6 -2.3
2.8 30
220. HAHN ET AL., REDUCE MORTALITY, supra note 183, at 16-17.
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Hazardous waste management
system: final solvents and dioxins
land disposal restrictions rule
Occupational exposure to
formaldehyde
Prohibit the land disposal of the
first third of scheduled wastes
("second sixth" proposal)
Land disposal restrictions-phase
II: universal treatment standards
and treatment standards for organic
toxicity, characteristic wastes, and
newly listed wastes
Drinking water regulations,
synthetic organic chemicals-phase
V
Solid waste disposal facility criteria,
40 C.F.R. pt. 257 & pt. 258
1986 EPA
1987 DOL 0.21 4.8
1988 EPA
1994 EPA
2.9 66
8.3 -8.2
1992 EPA 0.0061
1991 EPA 0.0049
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